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Quantum key distribution (QKD) has been proved to be information-theoretically secure in theory.
Unfortunately, the imperfect devices in practice compromise its security. Thus, to improve the
security property of practical QKD systems, a commonly used method is to patch the loopholes in
the existing QKD systems. However, in this work, we show an adversary’s capability of exploiting
the imperfection of the patch itself to bypass the patch. Specifically, we experimentally demonstrate
that, in the detector under test, the patch of photocurrent monitor against the detector blinding
attack can be defeated by the pulse illumination attack proposed in this paper. We also analyze
the secret key rate under the pulse illumination attack, which theoretically confirmed that Eve can
conduct the attack to learn the secret key. This work indicates the importance of inspecting the
security loopholes in a detection unit to further understand their impacts on a QKD system. The
method of pulse illumination attack can be a general testing item in the security evaluation standard
of QKD.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information security is a core of cybersecurity in the
digital era. Cryptography provides a vital tool to achieve
information security in cyber environment, particularly
when untrusted channels are used. Unfortunately, the
current widely-used public-key cryptographic infrastruc-
ture is threaten by a quantum computer [1]. To defeat
the threat from the quantum world, quantum key distri-
bution (QKD) [2] based on the laws of quantum mechan-
ics provides a long-term solution, which has been proved
its information-theoretical security. The key generated
via QKD can be applied to one-time-pad algorithm,
guaranteeing information-theoretically secure communi-
cation [3, 4]. Due to plenty of efforts, QKD has developed
with a fast pace even to be globalized and commercial-
ized, becoming one of the most mature applications in the
field of quantum information [5–9]. Owing to such fast
development, standardization of QKD is being consid-
ered in the European Telecommunications Standards In-
stitute (ETSI) [10], the International Standard Orgniza-
tion (ISO) [11], and the International Telecommunication
Union (ITU).
However, a practical QKD system may behave differ-
ently from its theoretical model which discloses secu-
rity loopholes that can be exploited by an eavesdrop-
per, Eve, to learn the secret key, compromising the
practical security of QKD systems [12–24]. To defeat
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quantum hacking, an effective countermeasure is to em-
ploy an innovative protocol, like measurement-device-
independent QKD (MDI QKD) [25] and twin-field QKD
(TF QKD) [26, 27], to remove the threat from loopholes.
However, the high demand of technique and relative low
key rate of the innovative protocols limit their application
and commercialization. Therefore, to relieve the security
threat on the QKD systems in use, it is essential to patch
the loopholes in the existing QKD systems [28, 29], most
of which employ prepare-and-measure QKD protocol.
As countermeasures, patches, instead of ending the
hacking story, lead to a new era of quantum hacking –
inspire quantum attackers to conduct a new round of
hacking investigation on the patched system. Patches
motivate Eve to discover the imperfection of the patches
themselves and the remaining loopholes that the patches
fail to close. Our work proposes a more general blinding
attack to bypass the photocurrent monitor. We discover
that, for the detector under test, bright pulses can blind
APD intermittently and meanwhile bypass the alarm of
photocurrent monitor, although reasonable qubit error
rate (QBER) is introduced. We call this method as pulse
illumination attack.
The pulse illumination attack is a more general type of
detector blinding attack than the original one that uses
continuous wave (c.w.) light. In this attack, Eve does
not only exploit the mode switch between the linear mode
and Geiger mode via light shining, but also makes refined
use of the hysteresis current after pulse shining to create
a period of full blinding and detection control. The deep
investigation on the loopholes strengthens Eve’s hacking
capability, and thus passes the challenge of protecting the
QKD system to countermeasure proposers again. This
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2study emphasizes the significance of further investigat-
ing the imperfections of single-photon detector, in order
to improve the security property of the standard prepare-
and-measure QKD systems that are deployed the most
in field [30–32]. Moreover, this study contributes a gen-
eral testing item to the security certification list of QKD
standard, which is being drafted in several international
organizations, e.g. ETSI, ISO, and ITU [10, 11, 33].
II. FROM C.W. ILLUMINATION ATTACK TO
PULSE ILLUMINATION ATTACK
In this section, we briefly review the origin blinding
attack, i.e., c.w. illumination attack, and then introduce
the countermeasure of the photocurrent monitor that is
believed to be effective to blinding attacks. Finally, we
propose pulse illumination attack as a new form of blind-
ing attack that can bypass the photocurrent monitor.
For a BB84 QKD system, Eve can apply the c.w. blind-
ing attack on APDs to eavesdrop the information. In the
original c.w. blinding attack, Eve injects continuous light
to generate a huge photocurrent through APD, which
lowers the bias voltage and pulls the APD back to the
linear mode that is insensitive to a single photon. Then,
she conducts a fake-state attack as follows. She first in-
tercepts and measures each state sent by Alice, and re-
sends a trigger pulse encoded by her measurement result
to control Bob’s clicks as the same as hers. For more
details about the original c.w. blinding attack, see Ap-
pendix A.
To patch the loophole exploited by the blinding at-
tack, some QKD systems including our testing object in
this work adopt a photocurrent monitor as a counter-
measure against the blinding attack [13, 17, 34]. This
countermeasure bases on an intuitive assumption that a
blinding attack will certainly generate a distinguishable
low-frequency photocurrent in the circuit of the detector.
The monitor extracts the low-frequency photocurrent as
an alarm of the blinding attack. Once the extracted pho-
tocurrent reaches an alarming threshold, the blinding at-
tack is considered to be launched. Please note that the
extracted photocurrent is named as reported photocur-
rent in the following text.
However, we find that this countermeasure can not
completely hinder the pulse illumination attack. This is
because the aforementioned assumption about the pho-
tocurrent under a blinding attack does not stand when
bright optical pulses are sent to blind an APD. In this
attack, a group of blinding pulses accumulatively intro-
duces a high photocurrent. This photocurrent is also able
to lower the bias voltage across the APD. As a result,
the detector is blinded at that time. After the blinding
pulses are gone, the detector is still blinded for a certain
period, because the photocurrent gradually reduces due
to capacitors in the detector. Thus the detector keeps be-
ing blinded until the photocurrent becomes fairly weak.
Eve can exploit the blinded period to launch the fake-
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FIG. 1. Experimental setup for the pulse illumination at-
tack. The double-channel arbitrary waveform generator ex-
cites 1550 nm lasers to generate the blinding pulses and the
trigger pulses. The trigger pulses do not contribute to blind
the APD and they are just used for calibrating the blinded
period and controlling Bob’s click. The manual variable at-
tenuator and the digital variable attenuator modulate the en-
ergy of the blinding pulses and trigger pulses precisely. The
50:50 beam splitter merges the blinding pulses and the trigger
pulses. We use a digital signal generator to synchronize our
blinding pulses and the trigger pulses with the single-photon
detector’s clock. The power meter monitors the total energy
of pulses going to the single-photon detector.
state attack to eavesdrop the information. Theoretically,
the length of the blinded period is positively correlated
with the energy of the blinding-pulse group.
Unlike the constant high photocurrent introduced by
the c.w. illumination attack, here the photocurrent varies
over time. The photocurrent monitor takes this current
as high-frequency noise and ignores most of it. Therefore,
Eve can apply the pulse illumination attack to eavesdrop
the information without being noticed by the photocur-
rent monitor.
III. EXPERIMENTAL DEMONSTRATION
As a third-party evaluator, we conducted tests about
the pulse illumination attack on a APD-based single-
photon detector module, provided by an independent
party. In the tests, we assume that Eve only knows the
public information of the detector as prior knowledge to
show a real-life hacking scenario. For the single-photon
detector module we tested, the frequency of gate signal is
40 MHz, and the photocurrent monitor inside the module
first filters the photocurrent in the circuit of the detec-
tor via a lowpass filter to avoid high-frequency noise. The
alarming threshold is set as 10 µA by the independent de-
tector provider, which is an optimum-performance value
to safely detect c.w. illumination blinding attack in prac-
tice. The threshold is far lower than the illegitimate value
(31 µA) when c.w. illumination blinding attack works, as
well as leaves a margin to the value of normal working
state (1.4 µA) to avoid false alarms due to occasionally
in-field fluctuation. The tested detector works at −50 ◦C
with dark count rate of 5× 10−6 per gate and 3% after-
pulse probability.
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FIG. 2. Oscillograms where a) the detector is blinded by a group of 500-cycle blinding pulses and b) a trigger pulse with energy
Enever / Ealways is sent during the blinded period to get no click/click.
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FIG. 3. The methodology of calibrating the blinded period
after a group of blinding pulses. We apply a weak trigger
pulse that contains 67 photons as a discriminator of blinding
inside the gate after the blinding pulses. We move the trigger
pulse to right gate-by-gate and repeat the calibration to probe
the boundary of the blinded period.
Our experiment setup is shown in Fig. 1. A digital sig-
nal generator synchronize the whole system. The channel
1 of the waveform generator excites a 1550 nm laser diode
to launch a group of blinding pulses with the frequency
as the same as that of the SPAD gate, 40 MHz. In our
experiments, the width of each blinding pulse was set as
4 ns, and we kept the energy of each blinding pulse be-
ing 13.32 pJ. The blinding pulses were applied outside
the gate signals to avoid unwanted clicks caused by the
blinding pulses. A group of blinding pulses only triggers
a click at the beginning of the group, which is followed
by 5µs dead time. After that, the detector is blinded due
to the accumulated photocurrent and Eve can launch the
fake-state attack in this blinded period during which no
dark count exists. Long intervals between groups are
necessary for reducing the low-frequency photocurrent
and avoiding being noticed by the photocurrent moni-
tor. 2 ms interval can satisfy such requirement in our
testing. This experimental result is shown in Fig. 2a.
The detailed analysis about the parameters of blinding
pulses are given in Appendix B.
The channel 2 of the waveform generator excites an-
other 1550 nm laser diode to launch a trigger pulse to
calibrate the length of the blinded period and the fully
controllable range inside. The methodology of calibrat-
TABLE I. The blinded period, the number of fully control-
lable gates, and the reported photocurrent under pulse illumi-
nation with different cycle numbers. The dead time caused by
the initial blinding pulse is not included in the blinded period.
The interval length between two groups of blinding pulses is
set as 2 ms. In all these cases, the reported photocurrent is
close to that in normal working state, 1.4 µA. The built-in
alarming threshold of the photocurrent monitor is 10µA.
Cycle
number
Blinded
period
(µs)
Fully
controllable
gates
Reported
photocurrent
(µA)
250 2.025 No data 1.8
300 20.025 No data 1.8
350 45.025 72 1.9
400 100.05 150 1.9
450 135.05 330 2
500 195.05 690 2.1
ing a blinded period is shown in Fig. 3. A trigger pulse
contains 67 photons, which can trigger a click in Geiger
mode but is not strong enough to trigger a click in the
linear mode. We first apply the trigger pulse at the gate
just after the group of blinding pulses. If the trigger pulse
causes no click, the detector is blinded during this gate.
The trigger pulse is then moved away from the group
of blinding pulses gate-by-gate to repeat the calibration
process until the trigger pulse causes a click. The pe-
riod of no click is the blinded period. The length of the
blinded period generated by a group of 250-/300-/350-
/400-/450-/500-cycle blinding pulses is shown in Table I.
As the trigger pulse contains multiple photons, the length
of the blinded period here is just conservative estima-
tions.
By a similar methodology but varying the energy of
the trigger pulse, we can further calibrate a fully control-
lable range. As shown in Fig. 2b, at each gate inside the
blinded period, we vary the energy of a trigger pulse to
observe the click probability and record the energy that
can trigger a click with the probability of 100%/50%/0%
as Ealways/E 1
2
/Enever. If Ealways < 2Enever, the detec-
tor at this gate in the blinded period is fully controllable
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FIG. 4. Ealways, E 1
2
and Enever inside the fully control-
lable range of a blinded period generated by a group of
350/400/450/500-cycle blinding pulses. The data not satisfy-
ing the fully controllable condition (Ealways < 2Enever) are not
included in this figure. The time origin is the arriving of the
first blinding pulse in the group. The inflection points are the
moments that the blinding pulses end, where the accumulated
photocurrent reaches to the maximum.
by Eve for a BB84 QKD system (while the rest gates
of the blinded period also do not have dark counts and
are partly controllable). The experimental data of the
fully controllable range in the blinded period generated
by a group of 350-/400-/450-/500-cycle blinding pulses
are shown in Fig. 4. Note that in all the testing above,
the reported photocurrent keeps being far lower than the
built-in alarming threshold of the photocurrent monitor
(10 µA), as shown in Table I.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS FOR A
DECOY-STATE BB84 QKD SYSTEM
In this section, we analyse Eve’s maximum-profit strat-
egy of attacking a real-life decoy-state BB84 QKD system
via pulse illumination, and we further study the threat of
this attack to the system. Here the detection parameters
are from the Gobby-Yuan-Shields (GYS) experiment [35].
The interval length, the blinded period, and the fully
controllable range are from our experimental results as
shown in Table I.
A. Eve’s maximum-profit strategy
The strategy of Eve’s attack is as follows. We as-
sume Eve uses lossless channels to connect Alice and Bob.
Without introducing deviation to the normal value of to-
tal gain, she launches fake-state attack during the fully
controllable range, while blocks or passes the state from
Alice during the unblinded time. Therefore, to eaves-
drop the maximum information, she needs to optimize
the parameters of her attack.
Specifically, three parts constitute the total gain un-
der Eve’s attack – the click trigger by each group’s first
blinding pulse, the gain under fake-state attack (QEveω )
during the fully controllable range, and the gain that Eve
blocks or passes the state from Alice during the unblinded
period. Regarding the fake-state attack, Eve first mea-
sures Alice’s state with a perfect detector and resends to
Bob by a trigger pulse with energy Ealways. Bob’s basis
choice matches to Eve’s half of the time, which triggers
a click at Bob’s detector with 100% probability. Thus,
QEveω =
1
2 (1−e−ω), where ω ∈ {µ = 0.6, ν = 0.2, 0} is the
mean photon number of the signal state, the decoy state,
and the vacuum state. When Eve blocks Alice’s states,
only dark counts, Y0 = 1.7×10−6, happen at Bob’s detec-
tor; when Eve passes Alice states via the lossless channel,
the corresponding gain is Qpassω = Y0 + 1− e−ηchηBobω =
Y0 + 1 − e−ηBobω (where ηch = 1 is the transmittance
efficiency of Eve’s lossless channel and ηBob is the trans-
mittance of Bob’s optical device). Therefore, the total
gain under the pulse illumination attack is
Qω =
1 + pQEveω Ncontrol
Ninterval
+
(Ninterval −Nblind −Ndead)[γQpassω + (1− γ)Y0]
Ninterval
=
1
Ninterval
+ pQEveω α+ (1− β)[γQpassω + (1− γ)Y0],
(1)
where Ncontrol/Nblind/Ndead/Ninterval is the gate num-
ber of the fully controllable range/the blinded period/the
dead time/the interval length for a group of blinding
pulses. α = Ncontrol/Ninterval, representing the control-
lable proportion of gates under the attack. 1 − β =
(Ninterval−Nblind−Ndead)/Ninterval, representing the pro-
portion of gates that are not affected by the blinding.
p ∈ [0, 1] is the proportion of Ncontrol that Eve launches
the fake-state attack. γ ∈ [0, 1] is the ratio that Eve
passes the photons from Alice during the unblinded time
in each interval. Accordingly, the total QBER is
Eω =
1
Qω
{ e0
Ninterval
+ pQEveω αedet
+ (1− β)[γEpassω Qpassω + (1− γ)Y0e0]},
(2)
where Epassω Q
pass
ω = e0Y0 + edet(1 − e−ηBobω). e0 = 0.5
is the error rate of the background noise. edet = 3.3% is
the misalignment error rate of the QKD optical system.
According to the principle of the attack, Eve has to
keep the total gain being indistinguishable with that in
5the normal working state (Qnormalω = Y0 + 1− e−ηBobηchω,
where ηch = 10
−0.21L
10 is the transmittance of the quantum
channel of the QKD system as a function of the channel
length L) to hide her existence by modulating p and γ.
Moreover, she will make p (γ) as high (low) as possible.
Consequently, when Eve tries to make p = 1 and γ = 0
initially, she may confront with two cases:
I: Qµ > Q
normal
µ . In this case, Eve only needs to
decrease p to apply less fake-state attack during
the fully controllable range to ensure Qµ = Q
normal
µ .
Thus, she can obtain almost all the information as
all rounds of communication are either controlled
or blocked.
II: Qµ < Q
normal
µ . In this case, Eve has to increase γ to
allow some photons pass from Alice to Bob without
any intervention during the unblinded time, while
keeps p = 1, and then increase Qµ to hide herself.
Therefore, she can just obtain part of the total in-
formation in the communication.
Under this strategy, the QKD system cannot be aware
of Eve’s attack by checking the total gain. The QBER
during the attack is shown in Fig. 5a.
B. The key rate estimated by Alice and Bob under
pulse illumination attack
According to the decoy-state protocol [36, 37], Alice
and Bob can estimate the yield and the error rate of a
single photon, which are given by
Y L1 =
µ
µν − ν2
(
Qνe
ν −Qµeµ ν
2
µ2
− µ
2 − ν2
µ2
Y0
)
eU1 =
EνQνe
ν − e0Y0
Y L1 ν
.
(3)
Submitting Eq. (1), Eq. (2), and Eq. (3) into the
GLLP [38], Alice and Bob can estimate the lower bound
of the key rate as
RLest = q
{−Qµf (Eµ)H2 (Eµ) + µe−µY L1 [1−H2 (eU1 )]} .
(4)
Here q = 1/2 for the BB84 protocol, f(Eµ) = 1.2 for
error correction, and H2(x) is Shannon entropy. The
RLest under no/350-/400-/450-/500-cycle pulse illumina-
tion attack with Eve’s strategy is shown by the blue line
in Fig. 5b/c/d/e/f.
C. The real key rate of the QKD system under
pulse illumination attack
To judge whether Alice and Bob overestimate the key
rate and thus introduce insecurity, we give the real upper
bound and the lower bound of the key rate when the pulse
illumination attack with Eve’s strategy is applied.
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FIG. 5. The simulation results of the security analysis. a) The
QBER with/without Eve’s pulse illumination attack. Here
350-/400-/450-/500-cycle attack introduce the same QBER.
b) The RLest when the system works without pulse illumina-
tion attack. The key rate decreases dramatically to almost 0
when the length is longer than 130 km. c)/d)/e)/f) The RLest,
RLreal and R
U
real under Eve’s pulse illumination attack with
350-/400-/450-/500-cycle illumination pulses.
The real yield of a single photon Y attack1 and its error
rate eattack1 under Eve’s attack strategy can be calculated
as
Y attack1 = Y0 + ηBob − Y0ηBob,
eattack1 =
1
Y attack1
(edetηBob + e0Y0).
(5)
Then, the real upper bound and the lower bound of the
key rate can be written as
RUreal =
1
2
(1− β)γµe−µY attack1 [1−H2(eattack1 )] (6)
6and
RLreal =
1
2
(1− β)γ{µe−µY attack1 [1−H2(eattack1 )]
−Qpassω fECH2(Epassω )}.
(7)
RLreal and R
U
real under 350-/400-/450-/500-cycle pulse
illumination attack with Eve’s strategy are shown
in Fig. 5c/d/e/f as the dashed and dash-dot lines. The
results show that Eve can successfully hack the QKD
system and learn the secret key under certain commu-
nication distance between Alice and Bob for the cases
considered here. Take the scenario of 500-cycle pulse il-
lumination attack as an example, we can easily find that
when the channel length is between 20 km and 43 km, the
estimated key rate by Alice and Bob is higher than the
real lower bound but lower than the real upper bound.
Thus, Alice and Bob overestimates the key rate. When
the length of the quantum channel is longer than 43 km,
we can ensure that the key rate estimated by Alice and
Bob is insecure, because RLest is higher than R
U
real. These
results are reasonable. When the channel length is short
Eve has to pass a large portion of signals from Alice, and
thus her threat to the QKD system is weak. The GLLP
equation still can estimate a secret key rate in the secure
range. However, as the channel length gets longer, Eve
can block more signals during the unblinded time to en-
large the proportion of the eavesdropped keys, and thus
threaten the security significantly. The GLLP equation
then cannot correctly estimate the secret key rate.
V. DISCUSSION
As we described above, the pulse illumination attack
can hack the passive quenching single photon detector
to eavesdrop secret information while bypass its pho-
tocurrent monitor. Here we extend the discussion to
the effectiveness of the pulse illumination attack on de-
tectors of other architectures or with other countermea-
sures. The pulse illumination attack can blind high-speed
self-differential detectors [39, 40], as this kind of detec-
tors can be blinded by triggering a sequence of detection
events [41], which can be achieved by the pulse illumina-
tion attack with a low blinding pulse energy. For active-
quenching detectors without a bias resistor [42], blind-
ing by bright illumination seems difficult. However, the
work of thermal attack shows that this kind of detectors
can also be blinded by the thermal effect of the injected
bright light [43], which implies that the pulse illumina-
tion attack with a higher blinding pulse intensity may
hack such detectors. In this case, the pulse illumination
attack tends to introduce a relatively higher generated
photocurrent which might reveal the existence of Eve.
However, Eve can further enlarge the inter-group interval
to decrease the low-frequency components of the gener-
ated photocurrent and hide herself again. A sophisticated
attack-monitoring method shown in Ref. [44] exploits the
accumulating statistics of times between consecutive de-
tection events. As the pulse illumination attack has vari-
ous adjustable parameters, its fingerprint on the statistics
might be attenuated. Recently, a countermeasure against
detector-control attacks using randomly switching vari-
able attenuators (VA) is proposed [45], where the switch-
ing of a VA’s attenuation value under c.w. illumination
will introduce random clicks and raise QBER to trigger
the alarm. However, the pulse illumination attack does
not illuminate constantly, and thus the switching proba-
bly does not lead to any abrupt changes on injected light
to cause random clicks. The practical effectiveness of
these countermeasures under the pulse illumination at-
tack should be analysed in a future testing.
Lowering the alarming threshold of the photocurrent
monitor can not effectively detect the pulse illumination
attack. In addition to frequent false alarms introduced by
this method, Eve can attenuate the reported photocur-
rent by enlarging the intervals to break this defense, as
shown in Appendix B. Improving the stop band of the
filter in the photocurrent monitor can reveal more evi-
dences of the pulse illumination attack, depending on the
value improved. However, improving the stop band ex-
tremely will also make the monitor in trouble with abun-
dant false alarms by noises and lose its functionality. An
extreme case is removing the filter to thoroughly expose
the uprising caused by the blinding pulses. In this case,
the alarm will definitely be triggered with the pulse il-
lumination attack, but frequent false alarms will also be
trigger when the detector is working normally. The fea-
sibility of any change of parameters in the photocurent
monitor should be tested in a future experiment, and the
change itself might introduce some new loopholes. To
patch the loophole exploited by the pulse illumination at-
tack and defend this kind of blinding attacks thoroughly,
we believe that the valid method is to integrate the loop-
hole into the security proof of QKD protocol.
VI. CONCLUSION
We investigate the effectiveness of a photocurrent mon-
itor as a countermeasure against the detector blinding at-
tack in a single-photon detector module that is provided
by an independent party. The testing results show that
the single-photon detector with a photocurrent monitor
is vulnerable to the pulse illumination attack. Via this
attack, Eve can blind the single-photon detector in a cer-
tain period and fully control its detection output, keep-
ing the reported photocurrent of the photocurrent mon-
itor similar to that in the normal state and thus without
alarming the monitor. We also perform the theoretical
security analysis to show that for a real-life QKD sys-
tem under pulse illumination attack, Alice and Bob may
overestimate the secret key rate and leak the key to Eve
in a certain distance range. This pulse illumination at-
tack indicates that the security issues in the detection
side might be still serious, which should be further in-
7vestigated. As this attack might seriously threatens the
practical security of QKD systems, pulse illumination at-
tack should be a standard testing item for the systematic
security evaluation of a QKD system.
We also provide more details on the photocurrent of
a detector under the pulse illumination attack obtained
from a white-box experiment on our homemade detec-
tor (see Appendix C), which may provide some ideas of
countermeasures against the pulse illumination attack.
However, patching only solves the problem in a short
term. A more secure method is to model the practical
single-photon detector in the security proof, if the non-
MDI-QKD system would like to be immune to various
blinding attacks in a long term.
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APPENDIX
Appendix A: Recap c.w. illumination blinding
attack
The BB84 protocol is typically used in QKD implemen-
tation, especially in commercial QKD systems. Under
this protocol, a QKD system can provide a information-
theoretical secure communication channel to the legiti-
mate users, as the existing of an eavesdropper will intro-
duce 25% or higher QBER and trigger the alarm [46–48].
Note that the above scenario only works well under the
assumption that the APDs works in Geiger mode [49],
where a single photon leads to huge transient avalanche
photocurrent and thus causes a click. However, a real-
life QKD system deviates from the ideal model: the APD
can be turned into the linear mode (be blinded) and then
the clicks are controlled by Eve. One approach to achieve
blinding is to illuminate the APD by carefully modulated
c.w. light. The principle behind the c.w. illumination
blinding is as follows. Bright c.w. light applied on the
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FIG. 6. Inner mechanism of the single-photon detector. a)
The core part of the circuit of a typical single-photon detector.
Rbias is a huge resistor for passive quenching while Ro is a
small resistor for readout. The voltage across Ro is Vo, which
is the carrier of the output signals. VHV is the DC source of
the single-photon detector’s circuit. Vbias is the bias voltage
across the APD. Normally, Vbias is lower than the breakdown
voltage (Vbr) and can be raised to be higher than it by gate
signals. b) Schematic diagram of the relationship between the
trigger pulse energy and the responding output signal when
the APD is in the linear mode. Ith is the threshold of a built-
in comparator in the circuit of the single-photon detector.
Enever/Ealways is the trigger pulse’s energy that triggers a click
with 0%/100% probability, because the bound of its error bar
is totally lower/higher than Ith. Two different background
colors intuitively indicate whether the trigger pulse can trigger
a click.
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FIG. 7. Faked-state attack on the blinded detectors when
Eve chooses the H/V basis and the intercepted measure-
ment result is |H〉. Eve resends a trigger pulse of |H〉 in
[Ealways, 2 × Enever). Only the situation that Bob chooses
matching basis with Alice is discussed here. a) Bob selects
the same basis (H/V ) with Eve. Subsequently, the full trigger
pulse transmits through the polarizing beam splitter (PBS)
and triggers a click that means 0, which is identical with Eve’s
measurement result. b) Bob selects the opposite basis (+/−).
Half energy of the trigger pulse, which is less than Enever, ar-
rives at each single-photon detector as the dashed line shows,
and none of them is triggered. In a word, Eve steals an ef-
fective bit when she chooses the matching basis, while blocks
the bit as her basis mismatches.
8APD knocks out many electron-hole pairs, and thus a
huge photocurrent is generated. According to the circuit
shown in Fig. 6a, the APD is in series with the Rbias,
so the strong photocurrent also goes through the Rbias.
Because the Rbias is a huge resistor for passive quenching,
the voltage across Rbias increases dramatically and thus
Vbias goes lower than Vbr as the total voltage is conserved.
Having been blinded, the single-photon detectors of
Bob can be controlled secretly by applying trigger pulses.
A trigger pulse can always trigger a click when its en-
ergy is higher than Ealways, and is impossible to trigger
a click when the energy is lower than Enever, as shown in
the Fig. 6b. More specifically, with the assumptions that
the all of Bob’s single-photon detectors are identical and
satisfy
Ealways < 2× Enever, (A1)
Bob can be fully controlled by the fake-state attack [50] if
the energy of the trigger pulse in [Ealways, 2×Enever). In
a round of the communication Eve intercepts the photon
and measures it in a randomly chosen basis, and then
resends a trigger pulse encoded by the measurement re-
sult to Bob. Eve can ensure that when she happens to
choose the same basis as both Alice and Bob, the infor-
mation of this round will be shared among Alice, Bob,
and Eve (see Fig. 7a), while Bob will get no click and
lose the information when Eve unfortunately chooses a
wrong basis (see Fig. 7b). Afterwards, with the help of
basis comparison in the post-processing (which happens
in a public classical channel and can be listened by Eve),
all of Alice, Bob, and Eve keep the bits that are measured
with same basis. As a result, Alice and Bob innocently
share the final entire secret key with Eve.
Appendix B: Detailed analysis on the parameters of
blinding pulses
Here we first demonstrate the simplest case – 1-cycle
blinding pulses in each group. In the experiment, we con-
trolled the interval between each group of blinding pulse
and the energy of each single pulse. Then we observed
the reported photocurrent. Fig. 8 shows the energy of
each single blinding pulses versus the reported photocur-
rent with interval of 500ns/600ns/700ns. Generally, the
reported photocurrent increases with the rising of single
pulse energy. The reported photocurrent rises slightly at
the beginning and then goes up dramatically at about
0.67 pJ. Finally, the reported photocurrent ascends lin-
early after 0.9 pJ. In addition, in Fig. 8, the points where
the reported photocurrent is higher than 31 µA means
that the low-frequency component is strong enough to
blind the APD in the whole time domain (constant blind-
ing).
The orange vertical arrow in Fig. 8 shows that the re-
ported photocurrent reduces as the interval rises. This is
because for the same energy of blinding pulse, the larger
interval between the groups results in the less generated
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FIG. 8. The reported photocurrent versus the energy of sin-
gle blinding pulse with interval of 500 ns/600 ns/700 ns. Here
the blinding pulses are in the simplest case, that is, 1-cycle
per group. Reported photocurrent higher than the constant
blinded threshold (31µA) indicates the APD is blinded in
whole time domain.
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FIG. 9. Constant-blinding energy versus interval length of
the blinding pulses. The constant blinding energy is defined
as the total energy of each group with 1/2/3-cycle blinding
pulses to blind the APD in the whole time domain.
photocurrent from different blinding pulses that super-
poses with each other. Consequently, the low-frequency
components of the superposed photocurrent are less,
which are reported by the photocurrent monitor. Con-
trarily, to increase the superposed photocurrent to con-
stantly blind the APD when the interval is extended,
higher energy of each blinding pulse is needed, as shown
in the blue arrow in Fig. 8. From the testing result, we
can see that Eve can extend the interval to reduce the
reported photocurrent, and thus avoiding the alarm of
the photocurrent monitor.
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FIG. 10. The 10-sample overlaid waveform of Vo of our home-
made single-photon detector a) without/ b) after blinding
pulses. The dashed line indicates the comparator threshold
for triggering a click. Here the comparator only works on the
timing when the output signals may occur. The fluctuation
ranges of the output signals are indicated by the double-head
arrows.
To further analyse the influence introduced by the cy-
cle number in each group, we measured the total energy
of each group with 1-/2-/3-cycle blinding pulses when
the APD is constantly blinded in the whole time do-
main (which is defined as constant-blinding energy in
the following text) versus the interval length. The mea-
surement results are shown in Fig. 9. Comparing among
the three curves in Fig. 9, for the same interval length,
the summation energies of each 1-/2-/3-cycle group to
constantly blind the APD are quite similar. Thus the
equivalence between a single blinding pulse and three
smaller blinding pulses is apparent. Moreover, the max-
imum intervals for the 1-/2-/3-cycle blinding pulses are
6 µs/12 µs/20 µs respectively. Taking the case of 1-cycle
for illustration, if the interval is longer than its maximum
value, the increased energy of pulses will no longer blind
the APD but cause unwanted clicks. However, its equiva-
lent split in 2-/3-cycle can still blind. Therefore, by using
this multi-cycle approach, the corresponding blinded pe-
riod is adjustable in a wider range.
Appendix C: The waveform of a homemade detector
under pulse illumination attack
To acquire some evidences left by a pulse illumination
attack, we conducted a white-box test of the pulse illu-
0 10 20 30 40 50
−20
0
20
40
Time [ns]
V
o
[m
V
]
FIG. 11. The waveform of Vo of our homemade single-photon
detector when a blinding pulse arrives the APD. A huge in-
stantaneous photocurrent hill is caused by the blinding pulse.
The smaller one is caused by the gate signal.
mination attack on our homemade single-photon detector
whose APD is produced by Princeton Lightwave. We di-
rectly observed the waveform of the voltage Vo across the
readout resistor Ro (for our homemade single-photon de-
tector, Ro = 50 Ω) in the circuit of the single-photon de-
tector shown in Fig. 6. The waveform of Vo without/after
blinding pulses are compared in Fig. 10. The fluctuation
ranges of the output signals are indicated by the double-
head arrows in the picture. Apparently, as shown in
Fig. 10a, when the blinding pulses are not applied, output
signals rise occasionally. These rises are strong enough to
reach the comparator threshold to trigger a click because
of the avalanche effect in Geiger mode. As a result, dark
counts are caused in this case. On the other hand, in
the blinded period under the pulse illumination attack,
the output signals jump frequently but just in a much
narrower range whose upper bound is far lower than the
comparator threshold as shown in Fig. 10b. Thus, dark
counts are eliminated in the blinded period.
Another interesting evidence is shown in Fig. 11, where
we can clearly see that a blinding pulse causes a huge
instantaneous photocurrent hill. A photocurrent monitor
might be capable of figuring out this evidence by some
engineering modifications, which may be not easy to be
realized. Researches on reliable countermeasures against
pulse illumination attack are still urgently needed.
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